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Abstract—Networked flying platforms can be used to
provide cellular coverage and capacity. Given that 5G and
beyond networks are expected to be always available and
highly reliable, resilience and reliability of these networks
must be investigated. This paper introduces the specific
features of airborne networks that influence their resilience.
We then discuss how machine learning and blockchain
technologies can enhance the resilience of networked flying
platforms.
Index Terms—Networked flying platforms, resilience,
self-organizing networks, machine learning, blockchain
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) introduced a new
challenge to cellular networks by acting as flying User
Equipments (UEs) that have much higher elevation than
ground users. In Fifth Generation (5G) and beyond
networks UAVs will be used for providing network
services to ground and flying UEs. In [1], we introduced
an architecture for Network Flying Platform (NFP) in 5G
and beyond networks. In this work, we aim to introduce
and investigate the issues related to the resilience of
airborne networks and in particular the introduced NFPs.
II. NETWORK RESILIENCE
In the literature there are several definitions for re-
silience of networks. In [2] resilience is defined as the
capability if the network to recover from the failures.
Sterbenz et al in [3] define resilience as the ability of
the network to provide and maintain an acceptable level
of service in the face of various faults and challenges to
normal operation. According to [3] resilience disciplines
are classified into two classes of challenge tolerance and
trustworthiness related disciplines. The first class relate
to the design of the system and include survivability,
disruption tolerance and traffic tolerance. The class of
trustworthiness disciplines relate to system performance
and include dependability, security and performability.
In studying the resilience of airborne networks, we
follow the definition provided by [3] and consider all the
mentioned disciplines. However, due to the special case
of airborne networks we need to emphasize on some
of the disciplines and add new ones. This is mainly
because [3] focuses on fixed networks and misses the
features of wireless like multi-operator environments and
spectrum/infrastructure sharing.
III. NFP FEATURES AFFECTING THE RESILIENCE
Talking about resilience of each type of networks, we
have to consider its and its components specifications
and limitations. NFPs have unique features that affect
their resilience.
A. Mobility
In an NFP, e.g. 3-layer architecture in [1], all the High
Altitude Platforms (HAPs), Medium Altitude Platforms
(MAPs) and Low Altitude Platforms (LAPs) are not
fixed and have the ability to change their position and
possibly their altitude. In one hand, mobility introduces
challenges like possible collisions among the flying plat-
forms, backhaul challenges, and connection loss. On the
other hand, mobility enables the network to proactively
respond to unpredicted events like UAV failures or a
sudden appearance of a demand hotspot. In the first
scenario, the platforms especially LAPs can re-organise
to preform self-healing, while in the second scenario an
LAP can move closer to the demand hotspot reducing
the distance between the access point and UEs and
the other LAPs reshape to cover the rest of the area.
Although mobility is not considered in [3] classification,
it will have a significant influence on challenge tolerance
related disciplines like distribution tolerance and traffic
tolerance as can be seen in the examples above.
B. Energy limitations
Most of the existing work [1], [4] consider battery
powered UAVs as the LAPs. This means that the UAVs
have a limited operation time and need to fly to charg-
ing stations imposing a (predictable) disruption to the
network. This feature clearly illustrates the importance
of reliable self-organising mechanisms in the network.
In these scenarios the self-organising system can either
seamlessly replace the leaving UAV with another UAV
(redundant), or change the network parameters, including
the position of LAPs, to deal with this disruption.
C. Physical vulnerabilities
Flying platforms are physically more vulnerable to ac-
cidental and intentional disruptions than fixed networks
components. Accidents that can take LAPs down include
lightning, strong wind, and clashing with birds. Flying
platforms can also be targets of intentional disruptions
like shooting or spoofing. Moreover, intruding drones
pretending to be members of NFP can disrupt the net-
work functionality without causing problem to a single
platform.
D. Multi-operator environment
Open air is not a restricted area, except restricted
zones defined by authorities, and several NFP operators
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Fig. 1: Classification of NFP features
and other professional/amateur drone operators can co-
exist. This dynamic environment will increase the chance
of collisions, turbulences, interference, and line-of-sight
blockage which affects both challenge tolerance and
trustworthiness related features of the network.
E. secondary duties
According to design and need of the system flying
platforms specially LAPs and MAPs can have secondary
duties like surveillance or protecting the network by
spoofing intruding UAVs [4]. Similar to energy limitation
case, this may cause the UAVs to leave their network
duties. Unlike the battery recharging case, the secondary
duties are not always predictable, especially in the case
of intrusion protection, which makes providing a redun-
dant UAV to seamlessly take on network duties of the
leaving UAV more challenging. In these scenarios self-
healing mechanisms help the network to maintain its
Quality of Service (QoS). Figure 1 shows the classifi-
cation of aforementioned features.
IV. STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE RESILIENCE OF NFPS
Most of the aforementioned features of NFPs that
influence their resilience are classified as challenge
tolerance-related which are not measurable. The chal-
lenges related to these features should be addressed in
the design and engineering of the network. Although
the resilience of a network cannot be measured based
on its design and engineering, they effect dependabil-
ity, security and performability of networks which are
measurable.
The dynamic environment and the duties of NFPs
require an architecture that enables autonomous reactions
to different disruptions. Therefore, NFP can benefit from
Self-organising Network (SON) technologies. As defined
in [5], SONs are adaptive, autonomous, and they are able
to independently decide when or how to trigger certain
actions based on interaction with the environment. In
[1] we proposed a multi-layer architecture for NFPs and
studied NFP specific SON features. To achieve better
resilience for NFPs we can use machine learning and
blockchain technologies.
A. Machine learning
A survey of machine learning techniques used in SON
for wireless networks and their applications is provided
in [5]. To the best of our knowledge there is no existing
work that studies the application of machine learning in
self-organizing airborne networks.
Resilinet project [3] proposes a two-phase resilience
strategy where the first phase is responsible for dealing
with the disruption and maintaining an acceptable level
of service while the second phase aims to help the
system to evolve and prevent and/or prepare for similar
future disruptions. Phase one consists of detect, defend,
remediate and recover, and phase two has two activities
of diagnose and refine. A resilient airborne network
can quickly detect disruptions and remediate. However,
an NFP can be more resilient using carefully trained
learning algorithms that can predict disruptions like
battery limitation or even possible intrusions.
Optimization and game theoretic modeling are the
most common methods in the existing works [1] for
planing the movement and position of flying platforms
to maximize the coverage area or to maximize the
delivered data rate to UEs. Several parameters effecting
the decision of these algorithms which are traditionally
set to an empirical mean value or inaccurately chosen
can be learnt by machine learning algorithms based on
the previous experiences [6]. This leads to faster and
more accurate reaction to a disruption.
B. Blockchain and smart contracts
Blockchain can be defined as a resilient, reliable,
transparent and decentralized way of storing and dis-
tributing a database across all nodes of a network [7].
Blockchain can assist with the security of NFPs against
intruders pretending to be members of the network
and/or spoofing attempts.
In a multi-operator environment smart contracts can
significantly help to manage space and spectrum sharing.
A smart contract is basically a contract that its terms are
enforced and executed automatically as computer codes
among the participating entities without the need of an
en-forcer or a third party. Smart contracts can facilitate
deployment of automated charging stations at the roof
of the building reducing the flight distance and time of
UAVs to recharge their batteries.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced specific features of NFPs
that affect their resilience. Most of these features are
related to the design and engineering of the network,
and are not easily measurable. We also named machine
learning and blockchain as two promising technologies
that can improve resilience of airborne networks.
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